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BOOK DISPATCH #559

TO : CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

15 MAR 1958

FROM: Chief, SR

SUBJ: General - REDCAP LCIMPROVE

Specific - RED-2: Operational Exploitation of Extramarital Relations  
of Soviets Abroad

ACTION REQUIRED: For information and passage to liaison

1. There is attached a REDCAP report entitled "Operational Exploitation of Soviets Abroad", based on information from [ ] (Source A) and [ ] (Source B) concerning the official Soviet attitude towards extramarital relations among Soviet officials abroad and between Soviets and indigenous women. The report also includes sources' thoughts concerning possible operational use of the knowledge that such affairs are taking place.

2. For the past year field stations have forwarded considerable information concerning extramarital relations of the Soviets assigned in their areas. In some cases the Soviets seemed to be acting in such a way as to contradict the Headquarters' belief that fraternization on a continuing basis was forbidden. The sources have, however, confirmed that belief (see Section B).

3. FYI: Addressee stations might be interested in the fact that the high-ranking official, whose wife was involved with the Ambassador (see Section A), was transferred back to Moscow before the end of his tour of duty. His wife naturally accompanied him.

Attachments: Red-2  
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OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION OF  
EXTRAMARITAL RELATIONS OF SOVIETS ABROAD

Two usually reliable defector sources were queried about the official attitude of the Soviet Government towards extramarital relations of Soviets stationed abroad. These sources were also questioned about the possibility of using the knowledge of such relations as a tool to bring about the defection of the Soviets involved. The cases presented to the sources and their comments follow.

A. AFFAIRS BETWEEN SOVIETS:

CASE: Sources were given two cases, one involving the Soviet Ambassador and the wife of a high-ranking Soviet and the other a clerk in one of the Service Attache's offices and an unmarried Soviet woman employee of the Embassy.

1. Source A stated that an affair between two Soviets is not considered a criminal act but an "administrative misbehavior". Source B added that punishment would be handled by the Party since such activity is not against Soviet law but a violation of the CP moral code. Punishment would be determined by the rank of the individuals involved and the degree of scandal given. High-ranking officials would suffer less punishment, if indeed any at all. Lack of scandal would be a mitigating factor.

2. Both sources agree that the punishment for such an "administrative misbehavior" would take one of three forms:

a. a mild reprimand consisting of a simple warning by the local Embassy CP organization or a "talk" with the Ambassador if a lower rank were involved;

b. a severe reprimand consisting of a recall to Moscow, a public tongue-lashing by the local CP organization and/or an appearance before the Central Committee of the CPSU;

c. expulsion from the Party - the highest form of discipline which would result in loss of job and of all privileges.

Either of the latter two punishments would also prohibit future foreign assignments which, Source B felt, would be the severest penalty of all. Source B reported that a record of all Party punishments is kept in each individual's dossier for a period of not less than a year, during which time the offender will not receive a promotion or his automatic advance in rank. Both sources commented that the KGB might be a little tougher on its personnel than the MID would be, particularly if the case went to the CC/CPSU. Since the CC/CPSU looks to the KGB as a protector,

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the misbehavior of a KGB man would perhaps result in more stringent punishment than that meted out to a MID man.

3. Either or both of the offending parties might be recalled to Moscow, but the reason given for the recall will be something other than the affair. In some instances only the unmarried Soviet involved is recalled. Source A gave as an example the case of two Soviet generals abroad, both of whom were involved with unmarried Soviet women. When Moscow was informed of this by the MGB, the women were recalled and the wives of the generals sent to join their husbands. Both sources felt it unlikely that top-ranking officers would be recalled. Source A included in this category ambassadors, counselors, KGB residents, TORGPRED representatives. Such officials would merely receive a warning to be more discreet in their entanglements. Their careers would not be affected and any punishment would be kept from their fellow workers since the "reprimand" would be carried out in the CC/CPSU, behind closed doors. Source B stated that the CC/CPSU, before recalling an Ambassador for misconduct of this nature, would weigh the question carefully in light of the belief that the recall of the Ambassador might be construed by host country officials to mean a change in the Soviet policy towards that country and might therefore result in unfavorable repercussions; with this in mind it might be decided to permit the Ambassador to remain at his post on the condition he used more caution in his behavior.

4. Both sources thought it extremely difficult to keep such affairs from coming to the notice of the KGB. Once an affair became known to the Legal Resident, he would cable Moscow and then mount watch over the couple. Moscow would inform the Resident how to proceed in the matter. Source A emphasized the known fact that no Soviet assigned abroad is exempt from SK checking and reporting. The Resident checks even on his own personnel. The Ambassador and the Secretary of the local CP check on the Resident. If the Ambassador learns that the Resident is conducting an affair, he would report it to Moscow, and the Resident in turn would report the Ambassador. Only in the very rare case in which the Ambassador and the Resident were close personal friends (and Source A says this would be rare indeed, as they are usually unfriendly towards each other) would the friendship rule out the mutual reporting. No Soviet, except in such a rare case as this, would feel himself immune to having his conduct reported. The SK worker would expect the same treatment.

5. Source A stated that the GRU uses a slightly different method in handling such cases than does the KGB. He felt that the Army has a less "democratic" attitude towards these situations. The Political Directorate at the local level handles the lesser officers with less public criticism and with the result that the culprit is dismissed. Misdemeanor cases involving high-ranking officers are handled by the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and are then forwarded to the Central Committee. Top officers may be dismissed, but are generally demoted and sent to outlying areas. Unlike KGB and MID personnel who would not be subject to incarceration, high Army officers might be imprisoned; however, they are usually sent to an outpost. Source stated that once a case arrives in the CC/CPSU, there is no distinction made in the handling of GRU, KGB or MID cases.

6. Source A remarked that the prime objective in handling such cases is to avoid scandal. There is danger of scandal should the innocent spouse object strongly, and, with the possibility of a scandal and its repercussions facing him, there is some fear the erring person might defect. Consequently, every effort is made to handle the case as quietly as possible.

7. Source B remarked that illicit relations between Soviet men and women generally exist in all Soviet installations abroad. Therefore, when such are reported to Moscow, there is little ado about it - shrugs and comments to the effect that such situations have always existed and will continue to exist. In connection with extramarital relations between high-ranking officials and their secretaries, Source B has quoted MALENKOV as saying, "from this the Revolution will not suffer". Source felt that the innocent spouse could be quieted by the reminder that open scandal would probably result in the couple being recalled to Moscow and prohibited from further foreign assignments, the innocent thereby being punished as much as the offender.

B. FRATERNIZATION: AFFAIRS BETWEEN SOVIETS AND INDIGENOUS WOMEN:

CASE: Sources were given the case of a high-ranking Soviet official stationed abroad who is in frequent contact with numerous indigenous women - when his wife is visiting in the USSR. His wife is well aware of his behavior. The official is suspected of being KGB.

1. Fraternization (other than for intelligence purposes) is absolutely forbidden. It is considered an act against the State, and therefore a criminal act. Source A stated that any Soviet having an affair with an indigenous woman, without the approval of his superiors, is committing an act of high treason.

2. Both sources implied that no Soviet would conduct an affair with an indigenous woman without the approval of the Ambassador and/or the Legal Resident and that, therefore, all such contacts may be construed as having an intelligence objective. If the Soviet initiated the original contact, he would have in mind the eventual recruitment of the woman for intelligence purposes. If the woman initiated the original contact, the Soviet's superiors would consider her a plant of a foreign intelligence service and approve the relationship in order to determine the purposes of the enemy service. Source A stated that such situations are the exception rather than the rule and that most Soviet intelligence officers are reluctant to become involved with local women for fear they may be suspect by their own service at a later date.

3. One disadvantage of such involvement on the part of a KGB man is the susceptibility of being blown to his fellow-countrymen as an intelligence officer. If his involvement were reported to the Ambassador by another Soviet without disciplinary action being taken by the Ambassador, it would indicate to the whole Colony that the offender was RIS. In cases where the Soviet is involved with an indigenous woman for intelligence purposes, every effort would be made to keep this from becoming Colony gossip. Should it become known, the Soviet would be reprimanded by his superior for careless handling of his operation.

4. Both sources felt it would be almost impossible for a Soviet to have frequent contact with an indigenous woman without it becoming known. Source B indicated that he knew of some instances in which Soviets had tried to claim they

were maintaining such contact for "business reasons"; however, when the contacts were not for intelligence purposes, the Soviets were almost always caught and recalled to the USSR. Exceptions to the rule of fraternization were made in Austria during the occupation when Soviet officers freely co-habited with the Austrian women, and in Germany at the present time.

5. Both sources agree that one may determine from the Soviet's manner whether the affair he is conducting with the indigenous woman is an intelligence operation or not. Source A suggested that a careful check be made to see if the man acts in a natural way about the affair. If he does act naturally about it and does not try to hide the contact, there is a definite intelligence interest involved, and the man himself is RIS. If he tries to hide it or if he seems nervous about it, it is not an operation.

6. Sources were specifically asked whether the SK worker would be immune to punishment if he were involved without permission with an indigenous woman. Source A remarked that the SK worker would not be immune, having to conceal the matter as much as any other Soviet. However, he said that an SK worker who believed himself "a little Napoleon" might feel he was answerable to no one and could therefore do as he wished. (Source mentioned an SK worker with such a complex who delved into the black-market; he was caught, however, and lost his job in the Party.) Source felt that if an SK man were "stupid enough" not to realize the risk of committing an act against the State and felt he could hide his behavior, it must be assumed he might be able to do so. However, if it came to the attention of the Resident, the SK man would lose his position and be recalled. Source B felt that an SK man has a better chance of hiding his misconduct, but if found out, would receive the same punishment as anyone else.

#### C. OPERATIONAL USE OF INFORMATION ON EXTRAMARITAL RELATIONS OF SOVIETS:

1. Source A stated that there was little a foreign intelligence service could gain from the knowledge that two Soviets were having an affair. As the matter is an "administrative misbehavior" rather than a criminal act, blackmail would work only in an exceptional case where the person involved was particularly ambitious and sensitive about his position and fearful of losing his job if discovered. However, Source A felt there would be little chance of success in trying to blackmail a Soviet who was simply involved with another Soviet. On the other hand, the Soviets would make use of such knowledge. The SK man would use this affair to blackmail the parties into acting as SK informants. This technique is used both in the USSR and in the Soviet colonies abroad. There is some chance that the Soviet thus blackmailed would be so angry at having to spy on his own kind that he might be open to an approach by the local intelligence service - but Source A again implied this would be a most exceptional case.

2. There would be more chance of success through the use of blackmail in the case of a Soviet who is involved with an indigenous woman without the knowledge of his superiors. The first question, of course, is whether the Soviet would report the blackmail attempt to his superiors, and whether the Soviet has reported his involvement with the woman. If the Soviet is not involved for operational reasons (and therefore has not the approval of his superiors), he would not report on himself. He would not report the fact that he had been accosted by a

woman if he thought it a simple sexual approach without intelligence overtones. If he thought it activity on the part of the local intelligence service, regardless of the nature of the approach, he would report it. If the Soviet were RIS, he would more likely report an initial approach, even if he did not think it sponsored by the local intelligence service, as it would have overtones of future possible operations and it would be up to his superiors to decide whether the woman could be recruited for operational use.

3. In selecting an indigenous woman to use in mounting an operation against a Soviet, Source A suggested that the woman be properly legended as a native of the host country. White Russians (emigrees) should be avoided as well as persons with a native fluency in the Russian language. A person who has studied the Russian language because she "is interested in the USSR" may, however, be used. Source stated that a Russian emigree woman, if used against a young, inexperienced and non-RIS Soviet, would be suspected by that Soviet of being an SK plant. An RIS man would not consider this as he would be aware of the rules which, according to both sources, prohibit the use of non-Soviets to infer on or to operate against a Soviet outside the USSR. The SK man, running an operation against his own people, would use only Soviets.

4. The mental attitude of a Soviet involved with an indigenous woman without the permission of his superiors (and therefore without intelligence objectives) must be taken into account when trying to mount an operation against the Soviet. The Soviet is conscious that he is committing a criminal act against the State. He knows that if he is caught he will be suspected of being a spy for a foreign intelligence service and might be punished as a spy. Source A stated that a Soviet, approached by his mistress with an offer to defect or be recruited in place, would suffer mental agonies. He would hesitate to report this defection approach since he had kept the association quiet. He would reason that the SK worker would say he had deliberately left himself open for an approach on the part of a foreign intelligence service, that he had only himself to blame, and that he would be suspected of being a spy for the foreign service. He would also feel that, if he refused the recruitment or defection offer, upon his return to the USSR the foreign intelligence service might approach him there.

5. These thoughts, Source A stated, could always be hinted at during the defection approach, but the Soviet should never be threatened with them as he might become frightened and report the approach. The woman could indirectly suggest them by mentioning her fears for his safety if he returns to the USSR and her inability to live if anything happened to him. If the recruitment/defection approach is made through the woman, her honesty is the central feature and her real weapon. If the Soviet is a bachelor, marriage is important. Pregnancy and a legal marriage constitute really effective blackmail. Equally effective would be the threat of legal action if the woman has undergone an illegal abortion. A good test of the Soviet's attitude towards the affair and his intentions towards the woman may be made by having the woman suggest pregnancy and asking what they should do about it.

6. Sources were requested to comment on the use of an official of the host country in making a defection approach using blackmail concerning extramarital activity as a basis for the approach, and to comment on the possibility of a Soviet reporting such an approach to his superiors.

7. Source A said that much depends upon the individual Soviet. If he were a good Soviet, he would then report it. However, he would not report it if a) the affair is the result of his inherent protest against the Soviet system; b) he is afraid of losing his job if he does report; c) he has a real fear of the CC or of punishment for other political crimes he might have committed; or d) he has a fear of being suspected of being an "enemy of the people" - a spy for the host government. The host official should speak openly to the Soviet and try to give the impression of wanting to help the Soviet, but at the same time indicate that he is quite willing to blackmail him into defection. The official should also suggest that the Soviet will be suspected of being an agent for the host government if he reports the approach and that the Soviet will lose either way - if he reports the approach, he will be suspect by his own service; if the host official reports him, he will also be suspect. Source A suggested that, when a host official is used in such an operation, the woman should be kept ignorant of the approach.

8. Source B felt that in most cases the Soviet would report any approach by a host country official. However, if the Soviet's standing in his job is poor and he has received poor efficiency reports or if he has often been in trouble, the threat might be effective and the defection pitch accepted. Source B stated that, if relations between the Soviet and the indigenous woman have gone farther than intended and she is pressing for money or for marriage, it would be better if the threat of exposure is made by her rather than by a host country official. After she has made the pitch, the official can handle the follow-up.

9. Source B stated that blackmail would be more effective if the Soviet involved were MID and not RIS. If he is an RIS man, it is essential to make certain he is not working on a case for the KGB and that he is not reporting his actions to the Resident. In either case, the chances of success are very small. It is also necessary to determine the man's position in the Embassy and Rezidentura, his influence in the USSR, and full details of his private life before contemplating an operation against him. Source B remarked that "it should be quite clear that the more we know about the Soviet's private life and works, the easier it will be to develop a workable operation". If he has important connections in the USSR, a blackmail threat will mean nothing to him. However, if he is already in trouble back home for other transgressions, he may be quite willing to lend an ear to any proposition.

10. Source A concluded that "all the old and tried methods are still good; all the old weaknesses are still targets". However, a blackmail operation of this type would be of use only to induce defection and not recruitment. Because the Soviet could never be certain that the SK had not discovered his entanglement with the indigenous woman, it would be very difficult for him to work under the fear of constant exposure. In some cases it might be possible to use him in place abroad, but when the time came for his return to the USSR, he would refuse to do so and would defect outright.